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Abstract	  
	  This	  paper	  will	  present	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  relational	  aspect	  of	  Brentano’s	  last	  theory	  of	   intentionality.	  My	  main	   thesis	   is	   that	  Brentano,	   at	   the	  end	  of	  his	   life,	   considered	  relations	  (relatives)	  without	  existent	  terms	  to	  be	  genuine	  relations	  (relatives).	  Thus,	  intentionality	  is	  a	  non-­‐reducible	  real	  relation	  (the	  thinking	  subject	  is	  a	  non-­‐reducible	  real	   relative)	   regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	   the	  object	  exists.	   I	  will	  use	  unpublished	  texts	  from	  the	  Brentanian	  Nachlass	  to	  support	  my	  argument.	  	  	  
Introduction	  	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  dominant	  interpretation	  of	  Brentano’s	  reistic	  theory	  of	   intentionality.	   I	   will	   show	   that	   intentionality,	   in	   Brentano’s	   last	   texts,	   is	   not	   a	  relation-­‐like	  entity	  but	  a	  genuine	  relation	  (the	  thinking	  subject	   is	  not	  a	  relative-­‐like	  entity,	  but	  a	  genuine	  relative).	  At	  the	  end	  of	  his	  life,	  Brentano	  tends	  towards	  a	  theory	  in	   which	   relations	   (relatives)	   without	   existent	   terms	   are	   genuine	   relations	  (relatives).	  Thus,	  intentionality	  is	  a	  non-­‐reducible	  real	  relation	  (the	  thinking	  subject	  is	   a	   non-­‐reducible	   real	   relative)	   regardless	   of	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   object	   exists.	   In	  other	  words,	   intentionality	   becomes	   for	  Brentano	  what	   scholars	   call	   an	   “abnormal	  relation”	   or	   a	   “non-­‐extensional	   relation”.	   I	   will	   conclude	   this	   paper	   by	   offering	   a	  criticism	  of	  Brentano’s	  last	  theory	  of	  intentionality.	  	  	  In	   the	   course	   of	   my	   argument,	   I	   will	   refer	   to	   two	   series	   of	   manuscripts	   from	   the	  
Nachlass.	  The	  first	  series	  is	  composed	  of	  unpublished	  texts	  useful	  for	  understanding	  the	   evolution	   of	   Brentano’s	   thought	   concerning	   relations	   and	   intentionality.	   The	  second	   is	   composed	   of	   published	   texts	   used	   by	   A.	   Kastil	   in	   his	   edition	   of	   the	  
Kategorienlehre.	   I	   will	   show	   that	   Kastil’s	   edition	   is	   not	   always	   faithful	   to	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  I	  presented	  a	  first	  draft	  of	  this	  paper	  at	  a	  conference	  organized	  by	  L.	  Cesalli	  and	  C.	  Majolino	  in	   Lille	   in	   May	   2012.	   During	   the	   conference,	   G.	   Fréchette	   told	   me	   that	   R.	   Rollinger	   had	  discovered	  significant	  differences	  between	  A.	  Kastil’s	  edition	  of	  the	  Kategorienlehre	  and	  the	  original	  Brentanian	  manuscripts.	  I	  therefore	  prepared	  a	  second	  draft	  of	  the	  paper,	  based	  on	  Brentano’s	  Nachlass.	  This	  second	  draft	  was	  presented	  at	  the	  Brentano	  Conference	  in	  2013	  in	  Salzburg.	   I	   thank	   the	   participants	   of	   both	   conferences	   for	   their	   remarks,	   and	   especially	  D.	  Fisette	  and	  the	  anonymous	  referee	  of	  this	  journal	  for	  their	  helpful	  feedback.	  
	   2	  
manuscripts.	   I	   will	   compare	   texts	   from	   the	   Kategorienlehre	   to	   sources	   in	   the	  
Nachlass;	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  text	  of	  Kastil’s	  edition	  is	  notably	  different,	  I	  will	  provide	  the	  original	  version.2	  	  	  
Relations	  and	  Relatives	  	  	  Brentano’s	  concept	  of	  intentionality	  can	  be	  better	  understood	  by	  taking	  his	  theory	  of	  relations	  and	  relatives	  into	  account.	  This	  theory	  is	  inspired	  by	  Aristotle’s	  concept	  of	  πρός	  τι	   (pros	  ti),	  or	   “toward	  something”	   (Cat.	  VII,	  6a36-­‐8b24;	  Met.	  Δ,	  15,	  1020b26-­‐1021b11).	  For	  Aristotle,	  “πρός	  τι”	  designates	  either	  relations	  or	  relatives	  (Met.	  Δ,	  15,	  1021b6-­‐8).	  Relations,	  for	  Aristotle,	  are	  sui	  generis	  abstract	  accidents	  and	  form	  one	  of	  his	   categories;	   an	   example	   of	   a	   relation	   is	   ‘fatherhood’.	   Relatives	   are	   accidental	  compounds	  constituted	  of	  a	  substance,	  or	  relatum,	   and	  a	  relation;3	  an	  example	  of	  a	  relative	  is	  ‘father’,	  which	  is	  constituted	  by	  a	  substance,	  or	  relatum,	  and	  the	  relation	  of	  fatherhood.	  Aristotle	  states	  that	  every	  relative	  has	  a	  correlative,	  i.e.	  that	  relatives	  are	  dependent	   on	   one	   another.	   This	   means	   that	   no	   relative	   can	   be	   presented	   if	   its	  correlative	   is	   not	   presented.	   For	   example,	   one	   cannot	   present	   a	   father	   without	  presenting	   a	   son,	   and	   vice	   versa.	   In	   other	   words,	   relatives	   are	   epistemologically	  dependent	  on	  one	  another.	  But	   relatives	  are	  not	  only	  epistemologically	  dependent.	  Indeed,	   no	   relative	   can	   exist	   without	   a	   correlative.	   Thus,	   relatives	   are	   also	  ontologically	   dependent	   on	   one	   another.	   This	   means	   that	   when	   a	   relative	   exists,	  namely	   when	   a	   substance	   bears	   a	   relation	   to	   another	   substance,	   the	   second	  substance	  also	  exists	  and	  has	  a	  converse	  relation	  to	  the	  first	  substance.	  For	  example,	  if	   Sophroniscus	   is	   the	   father	   of	   Socrates,	   Sophroniscus	   is	   the	   bearer	   of	   a	   relation,	  fatherhood;	   and	   in	   parallel,	   Socrates	   is	   the	   son,	   and	   is	   the	   bearer	   of	   the	   converse	  relation,	  sonship.	  	  	  Brentano	   is	   faithful	   to	   Aristotle’s	   theory.	   Before	   the	   adoption	   of	   reism,	   he	   admits	  relations	   in	   his	   ontology,	   considers	   relatives	   to	   be	   accidental	   compounds	  made	   of	  substances	   and	   relations,	   and	   recognizes	   the	   epistemological	   and	   ontological	  dependences	  of	  relatives.	  One	  text	  of	  the	  Nachlass	  shows	  that:	  	  
 A	  relation	  (a	  πρός	  τι)	  is	  given,	  when	  for	  two	  things,	  a	  predicate	  applied	  to	  one	  of	  them	  involves	  also	  the	  predication	  of	  a	  definite	  predicate	  of	  the	  other	  thing.	  This	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  one	  says:	  the	  existence	  of	  one	  correlative	  is	  linked	  to	  that	  of	  the	  other,	  and	  also	  the	  knowledge	  of	  one	  of	  them	  is	  inseparable	  from	  that	  of	  the	  other.	  Examples:	  Phaidon	  is	  taller	  than	  Socrates.	  Socrates	  is	  shorter	  than	  Phaidon.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  A	  new	  edition	  of	  the	  Kategorienlehre	  is	  a	  major	  Desiderat	  der	  Forschung.	  It	  would	  allow	  for	  controlling	  the	  whole	  of	  Kastil’s	  book.	  My	  paper,	   in	  contrast,	  only	  concerns	  the	  texts	  edited	  by	  Kastil	  on	  relations	  and	  relatives.	  3	  For	  the	  concept	  of	  an	  accidental	  compound	  in	  Aristotle,	  see	  Lewis	  1991,	  p.	  85–140.	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A	  has	  a	  causal	  influence	  on	  B.	  B	  undergoes	  an	  effect	  due	  to	  A.	  (Ms.	  Ps	  34,	  Von	  den	  Relationen,	  n°51088	  (undated);	  my	  translation)4	  	  	  This	   is	   an	  extract	   from	  a	   long	  manuscript	   about	   relations⎯manuscript	  Ps	  34.	  This	  manuscript	  is	  partly	  undated	  and	  partly	  dated	  1908.	  The	  quoted	  passage	  comes	  from	  the	  undated	  part	  of	   the	  manuscript.	   It	   is	   certainly	  pre-­‐reistic,	   since	   it	   is	  written	  by	  Brentano	   himself,	   who	   started	   to	   have	   problems	   with	   his	   sight	   around	   1904.5	  However,	   here	  we	   are	   interested	   in	   reism.	   As	  we	   know,	   Brentano,	   after	   his	   reistic	  turn	   of	   1904,	   reduces	   his	   ontology	   to	   concrete	   individual	   entities,	   namely	   things	  (Dinge),	  also	  called	  realities	  (Realia)	  (see	  Chrudzimski	  2004,	  p.	  176–210).	  Even	  if	  he	  continues	  to	  use	  abstract	  accidental	  nouns,	  for	  example	  “quality”	  and	  “whiteness”,	  or	  “relation”	  and	  “fatherhood”	  (and	  I	  follow	  him,	  by	  using	  “relation”	  and	  “intentionality”	  in	  this	  paper),	  he	  does	  not	  admit	  abstract	  accidents	  anymore⎯an	  accident	  does	  not	  exist	   in	   abstraction	   from	   a	   substance.	   Therefore,	   all	   accidents	   become	   concrete	  individual	  wholes	  with	  a	  substance	  as	  a	  part.	  Thus,	  for	  a	  correct	  view	  of	  a	  Brentanian	  correlation	   in	   reism,	   one	   should	   keep	   in	   mind	   Brentano’s	   rejection	   of	   abstract	  accidents.	  However,	  the	  scheme	  remains	  similar:	  a	  correlation,	  in	  reism,	  entails	  two	  interdependent,	   concrete,	   relative,	   accidental	   wholes,	   namely	   two	   relatives,	   for	  example	  father	  and	  son,	  each	  having	  a	  substance,	  or	  relatum,	  as	  a	  part,	   for	  example	  Sophroniscus	  and	  Socrates:	   	   	   1.	  Brentanian	  reistic	  correlation	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  “Eine	   Relation	   (ein	   πρός	   τι)	   ist	   gegeben,	   wenn	   von	   zwei	   Dingen	   dem	   einen	   ein	   Prädicat	  
zukommt,	   welches	   die	   Prädicierung	   eines	   bestimmten	   Prädicats	   auch	   von	   dem	   andern	   Ding	  
involviert.	  Daher	  sagt	  man:	  die	  Existenz	  eines	  Correlativs	  sei	  an	  die	  des	  andern	  gebunden	  und	  
auch	   die	   Erkenntnis	   des	   einen	   sei	   von	   der	   des	   andern	   untrennbar.	   Beispiele:	   Phaidon	   ist	  
<grösser	   als>	   Sokrates<.>	   Sokrates	   ist	   <kleiner	   als>	   Phaidon.	   A	  wirkt	   auf	   B.	   B	   erleidet	   einen	  
Einfluss	   von	   A.”	   (For	   all	   manuscripts:	   Franz	   Clemens	   Brentano	   Compositions	   (MS	   Ger	   230),	  Houghton	  Library,	  Harvard	  University.)	  5	  On	  Brentano’s	  sight	  problems,	  see	  the	  letter	  from	  Marty	  from	  the	  18th	  of	  September	  1904,	  in	  Brentano	  1977,	  p.	  110,	  and	  Chisholm,	  Marek	  1988,	  p.	  1.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  material	  data	  from	  the	   quoted	   passage⎯pen,	   ink,	   paper⎯,	   G.	   Fréchette,	   whom	   I	   thank	   for	   the	   information,	  considers	  it	  to	  be	  from	  the	  end	  of	  1890	  or	  the	  beginning	  of	  1900.	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As	  we	  can	  see,	  the	  existence	  of	  each	  concrete	  relative	  accidental	  entity	  entails	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  substance	  that	  is	  part	  of	  it:	  if	  the	  father	  and	  the	  son	  exist,	  then	  Sophroniscus	  and	  Socrates	  exist.	  Now,	  if	  one	  applies	  this	  structure	  to	  intentionality,	  one	  has	  two	  relatives,	  namely	  a	  thinking	  subject	  and	  a	  thought-­‐of	  thing,	  and	  two	  
relata,	  namely	  a	  subject	  and	  a	  thing:	   2.	  Intentional	  correlation	  	  	  
	  But	  Brentano	  says,	  after	  his	  reistic	  turn,	  that	  “being	  thought”	  has	  no	  real	  significance	  (reale	  Bedeutung)	  for	  the	  thing	  of	  which	  it	  is	  said:	  
 What	   distinguishes	   a	   relative	   determination	   from	   an	   absolute	   determination?	   The	  answer	   is	   this.	  Whenever	   one	   thinks	   a	   relative	   determination	   in	  recto,	   then	   one	   also	  presents	  something	  in	  obliquo.	  Thus,	  one	  who	  thinks	  of	  someone	  seeing	  is	  also	  thinking	  
in	  obliquo	  of	  something	  colored	  that	  is	  thus	  seen.	  While	  that	  which	  is	  thought	  in	  recto	  is	  a	   relative	   determination	   of	   real	   signifiance	   for	   some	   substance,	   the	   correlative	  determination	  can	  be	  a	  mere	  denominatio	  extrinseca.	  For	  example,	  the	  correlate	  of	  that	  which	   is	   thinking	   is	   that	   which	   is	   thought,	   and	   nothing	   is	   changed	   in	   the	   thing	   by	  reason	   of	   its	   being	   thought;	   indeed,	   the	   thing	   need	   not	   even	   exist	   in	   order	   to	   be	  thought.	   The	   same	   holds	   for	   the	   agent	   which	   is	   correlative	   to	   something	   suffering.	  Nothing	   changes	   in	   the	   agent	   insofar	   as	   it	   is	   active,	   and	   a	   thing	   that	   produces	  aftereffects	  need	  not	  exist	  at	  all	  when	  he	  produces	   these	  effects.	  Thus,	   the	  correlates	  here	   are	   denominationes	   extrinsecae.	   (Kategorienlehre,	   p.	   237–238	   (02.03.1916);	  transl.	  R.	  M.	  Chisholm,	  N.	  Guterman,	  p.	  171,	  slightly	  modified)6	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  “Fragt	  man,	  was	  eine	  relative	  Bestimmung	  im	  Unterschiede	  von	  einer	  absoluten	  sei,	  so	  ist	  zu	  
antworten,	  wer	   eine	   relative	   Bestimmung	   in	   recto	   denkt,	   stellt	   immer	   auch	   etwas	   in	   obliquo	  
vor.	   So	   denkt	   einer,	   der	   einen	   Sehenden	   denkt,	   in	   obliquo	   auch	   ein	   Farbiges,	   das	   von	   diesem	  
gesehen	   wird.	   Wenn	   das	   in	   recto	   Vorgestellte	   eine	   relative	   Bestimmung	   ist,	   welche	   für	   eine	  
Substanz	   reale	   Bedeutung	   hat,	   so	   kann	   die	   korrelative	   Bestimmung	   eine	   blosse	   denominatio	  
extrinseca	   sein.	   So	   ist	   z.	  B.	   das	  Korrelat	  des	  Denkenden	  das	  Gedachte,	  und	  an	  dem	  Ding	  wird	  
dadurch,	  dass	  es	  gedacht	  wird,	  nichts	  geändert;	  ja	  es	  braucht	  nicht	  einmal	  zu	  sein,	  um	  gedacht	  
zu	   sein.	   Ähnliches	   gilt	   vom	   Wirkenden,	   das	   dem	   Leidenden	   als	   Korrelat	   entspricht.	   Am	  
Wirkenden	   ändert	   sich	   nichts,	   insofern	   es	  wirkend	   ist,	   und	   ein	  Nachwirkendes	   braucht	   selbst	  
gar	   nicht	   zu	   sein,	   wenn	   es	   nachwirkt.	   So	   sind	   denn	   hier	   die	   Korrelate	   denominationes	  
extrinsecae.”	  (From	  Ms.	  88,	  Über	  die	  Kategorien,	  n°31006;	  no	  important	  modifications.)	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Why?	  Because	  if	  the	  correlate	  of	  the	  act	  were	  real	  and	  existent,	  the	  second	  substance,	  as	  a	  part	  of	  it,	  would	  always	  be	  real	  and	  existent,	  since	  no	  substance	  can	  be	  part	  of	  a	  real	   and	   existent	   accident	   without	   being	   itself	   real	   and	   existent.	   Thus,	   thinking	   of	  non-­‐existent	   objects	   would	   be	   impossible.	   To	   say	   this	   in	   non-­‐reistic	   terms:	   the	  mental	  act	   is	  a	  relation	  that	   is	  sometimes	  directed	  upon	  things	  that	  do	  not	  exist,	   in	  other	  words	  a	  relation	  directed	  upon	  non-­‐existent	  relata.	  Therefore,	  a	  converse	  real	  relation	  in	  the	  object	  should	  not	  exist,	  or	  else	  the	  object	  would	  be	  real	  and	  existent,	  since	   a	   real	   relation	   cannot	   exist	  without	   being	   the	   relation	   of	   a	   real	   and	   existent	  bearer.	  Thus,	  as	  regards	  intentionality,	  the	  only	  thing	  that	  exists	  is	  a	  thinking	  subject	  (see	  Sauer	  2006,	  p.	  21–23):7	   3.	  Brentanian	  reistic	  intentional	  “correlation”	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  problem	   is	   that	   this	   theory	  of	   intentionality	   entails	   the	   existence	  of	   a	   relative,	  namely	   the	   thinking	  subject,	  which	  bears	  a	  relation	  that	  relates	   to	  nothing.	  Thus,	   it	  seems	   that	   Brentano	   admits	   what	   scholars	   call	   “abnormal”	   or	   “non-­‐extensional	  relations”,	   namely	   relations	   that	   lack	   an	   existent	   term.8	  Indeed,	   Brentano	   never	  stopped	  thinking	  of	  intentionality	  as	  a	  relation.	  The	  following	  text	  from	  1916	  shows	  this:	  	  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Before	  reism,	  Brentano	  considered	  'being	  thought'	  to	  be	  an	  essential	  attribute	  of	  an	  unreal,	  existent	  mind-­‐dependent	  entity	  upon	  which	  the	  mental	  act	  was	  directed,	  namely	  a	  “mental	  correlate”	   or	   internal,	   “intentional	   object”.	   Thus,	   the	   intentional	   relation	   always	   had	   an	  existent	   term.	   Recently,	   some	   scholars	   have	   rejected	   this	   traditional	   interpretation	   of	  Brentano’s	   pre-­‐reistic	   theory	   of	   intentionality:	   the	   “mental	   correlate”	   and	   the	   “intentional	  object”	   would	   not	   be	   one	   and	   the	   same	   entity.	   For	   further	   information,	   see	   Sauer	   2006,	  Antonelli	   2011	   and	   Fréchette	   2013.	   In	   this	   paper,	   I	   assume	   the	   traditional	   interpretation:	  before	   reism,	   Brentano	   admitted	   unreal	   existent	   mind-­‐dependent	   correlates	   that	   were	  internal,	   intentional	  objects.	   In	   reism,	  Brentano	   rejects	   the	  existence	  of	   these	  entities.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  when	  the	  thinking	  subject	  thinks	  of	  non-­‐existent	  objects,	  there	  is	  nothing	  upon	  which	  the	  intentional	  relation	  is	  directed.	  	  8	  See	   Findlay	   1968,	   p.	   35,	   quoted	   in	   Haldane	   1996,	   p.	   97;	   for	   the	   expression	   “abnormal	  relation”,	   see	   Grossmann	   1969,	   p.	   31–32,	   1984,	   p.	   50–51	   and	   1992,	   p.	   94–95;	   for	   the	  expressions	   “nicht-­‐extensionale	   Relation”	   and	   “non-­‐extensional	   relation”,	   see	   Chrudzimski	  2001,	  p.	  239	  and	  Chrudzimski,	  Smith	  2004,	  p.	  216.	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Whoever	  presents	  in	  recto	  one	  who	  is	  thinking	  as	  one	  who	  is	  thinking	  also	  presents	  in	  
obliquo	  something	  which	  is	  the	  object	  upon	  which	  the	  one	  who	  is	  thinking	  is	  directed.	  One	  calls	  this	  an	  intentional	  relation.	  (Kategorienlehre,	  p.	  282	  (29.03.1916);	  transl.	  R.	  M.	  Chisholm,	  N.	  Guterman,	  p.	  199,	  slightly	  modified)9	  	  	  To	  overcome	  the	  difficulty,	  many	  scholars	  have	  argued	  that	  Brentano’s	  last	  theory	  of	  intentionality	   is	  not	  a	   relational	  but	  an	  adverbial	   theory,	  namely	  a	   theory	   in	  which	  intentionality	   is	   an	   absolute	   feature	   of	   the	   subject.	   The	   main	   source	   of	   this	  interpretation	   is	   a	   text	   of	   1911,	   namely	   the	   Appendix	   to	   the	   re-­‐edition	   of	   his	  
Psychology,	   where	   Brentano	   affirms	   that	   the	   thinking	   subject	   is	   not	   a	   relative	   but	  something	   relative-­‐like	   (etwas	   “Relativliches”).	   Since	   R.M.	   Chisholm,	   interpreters	  have	  argued	  that	  Brentano	  denies,	   from	  an	  ontological	  point	  of	  view,	   the	  relational	  aspect	   of	   intentionality,	   and	   that	   he	   maintains	   only	   a	   relational	   “grammar”	   for	  intentionality	   (Chrudzimski,	   Smith	   2004,	   p.	   216;	   on	   the	   grammar	   of	   intentionality,	  see	   Chrudzimski	   2001,	   p.	   240).	   What	   does	   this	   mean,	   exactly?	   Brentano,	   in	   this	  famous	  Appendix,	  says	  that	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  intentional	  relation	  and	  other	  relations,	   namely	   comparative	   and	   causal	   relations,	   is	   that	   the	   intentional	   relation	  does	  not	  necessarily	  have	  a	   term,	  whereas	   the	  others	  always	  have	  a	   term.	   In	  other	  words,	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   intentional	   relation	   does	   not	   imply	   the	   existence	   of	  something	   else,	   so	   that	   the	   intentional	   relation	   occurs	   even	   when	   the	   term	   upon	  which	  it	  is	  directed	  does	  not	  exist.	  However,	  according	  to	  Brentano,	  the	  presentation,	  
in	   modo	   recto,	   of	   someone	   thinking	   of	   something	   is	   impossible	   without	   the	  concomitant	   presentation,	   in	  modo	   obliquo,	   of	   the	   object	   upon	   which	   the	   thinking	  subject	   is	   directed.10	  Now,	   in	   1911,	   Brentano,	   faithful	   to	   his	   pre-­‐reistic	   theory	   of	  relatives,	  considers	  that	  “relatives”	  whose	  existence	  does	  not	  imply	  the	  existence	  of	  something	  else	  are	  not	  ontologically	  relative.	  This	  seems	  quite	  reasonable.	  Thus,	  the	  intentional	  relation	  is	  not	  a	  relation	  from	  an	  ontological	  point	  of	  view.	  However,	  it	  is	  relational	   from	   an	   epistemological	   or	   “grammatical”	   point	   of	   view,	   since	   the	  presentation	   of	   the	   thinking	   subject	   entails	   the	   concomitant	   presentation	   of	   the	  object	  upon	  which	  the	  subject	  is	  directed.	  This	  is	  why	  Brentano	  says	  that	  the	  thinking	  subject	   is	  relative-­‐like;	  and	  according	  to	   the	  standard	   interpretation,	   “relative-­‐like”,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  “[…]	  wer	  ein	  Denkendes	  als	  Denkendes	  in	  recto	  vorstellt,	  stellt	  auch	  etwas	  in	  obliquo	  vor,	  auf	  
welches	   sich	   das	   Denkende	   als	   den	   Gegenstand	   seines	   Denkens	   bezieht.	   Man	   nennt	   das	   eine	  
intentionale	   Beziehung.”	   (From	   Ms.	   M	   89,	   Über	   die	   Kategorien,	   n°31050;	   no	   important	  modifications.)	  10	  The	   distinction	   between	   modus	   rectus	   and	   modus	   obliquus	   is	   not	   easy	   to	   understand.	  Following	  S.	  Körner	  and	  R.	  M.	  Chisholm	  (Körner,	  Chisholm	  1976,	  p.	  XVI),	  I	  would	  say	  that	  a	  presentation	   in	   modo	   obliquo	   is	   an	   “indirect”	   presentation,	   accompanying	   another	  presentation,	  which	  is	  direct,	  or	  “normal”,	  i.e.	  in	  modo	  recto,	  when	  this	  other	  presentation	  is	  the	  presentation	  of	  a	   relative	  entity:	  a	   relative	  cannot	  be	  presented	  without	  a	  concomitant	  presentation	   of	   that	   to	   which	   it	   is	   relative.	   According	   to	   Brentano,	   these	   two	   modes	   are	  independent	  with	  respect	  to	  belief:	  I	  can	  believe	  that	  the	  entity	  presented	  in	  recto	  exists	  and	  at	   the	   same	   time	   believe	   that	   the	   entity	   presented	   in	   obliquo	   does	   not	   exist,	   for	   example	  when	  I	  think	  of	  someone	  thinking	  of	  phantoms	  (Brentano	  1977,	  p.	  284–285).	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from	   an	   ontological	   point	   of	   view,	   means	   “non	   relative”,	   i.e.	   “absolute”	   (see	  Chrudzimski	  2001,	  p.	  235;	  Chrudzimski,	  Smith	  2004,	  p.	  215–216).	  	  	  
Intentional	  Relation	  and	  Absolute	  Features	  of	  the	  Subject	  	  Traditionally,	  scholars	  consider	  the	  intentional	  relation,	  in	  Brentano’s	  reistic	  theory,	  to	   be	   nothing	   more	   than	   an	   absolute	   feature	   of	   the	   subject.	   However,	   to	   my	  knowledge,	   Brentano	   never	   explicitly	   affirms	   that	   intentionality	   is	   an	   absolute	  feature.	   I	   would	   now	   like	   to	   present	   a	   rather	   difficult,	   unpublished	   text	   where	  Brentano	   discusses	   interactions	   between	   the	   intentional	   relation	   and	   the	   absolute	  features	  of	  the	  subject.	  This	  text	  is	  from	  the	  afore-­‐mentioned	  manuscript	  Ps	  34,	  from	  the	  dated	  part	  of	  the	  manuscript.	  It	  is	  a	  text	  from	  1908,	  i.e.	  from	  the	  reistic	  period.	  I	  provide	  a	  transcription	  of	  the	  text	  as	  an	  appendix	  to	  this	  paper	  (see	  Appendix	  1).	  	  In	  this	  text,	  Brentano	  studies	  three	  kinds	  of	  relations:	  relations	  of	  comparison,	  causal	  relations,	   and	   intentional	   relations.	  According	   to	   the	   text,	   relations	   can	  be	   founded	  upon	  three	  kinds	  of	  fundaments.	  The	  first	  kind	  of	  fundament	  is	  composed	  of	  absolute	  features	  that	  include	  no	  reference	  (Hinweis)	  to	  anything	  else,	  which	  means	  that	  they	  are	   not	   dependent,	   for	   their	   existence,	   on	   anything	   else.	   The	   second	   kind	   of	  fundament	   is	   composed	   of	   absolute	   features	   that	   include	   an	   indefinite	   reference	  (unbestimmter	  Hinweis)	  to	  something	  else,	  which	  means	  that	  they	  are	  dependent,	  for	  their	  existence,	  on	  any	  individual	  of	  a	  certain	  species.	  The	  third	  kind	  of	  fundament	  is	  composed	  of	  absolute	  features	  that	  include	  a	  definite	  reference	  (bestimmter	  Hinweis)	  to	   something	   else,	  which	  means	   that	   they	   are	   dependent,	   for	   their	   existence,	   on	   a	  certain	   individual.	   As	   an	   example	   of	   the	   first	   kind,	   Brentano	   mentions	   colours:	  colours	  are	  not	  dependent	  on	  anything	  else	  for	  their	  existence.	  As	  an	  example	  of	  the	  second	   kind,	   Brentano	   mentions	   suffering	   (Leiden):	   an	   effect	   is	   dependent,	   for	   its	  existence,	  on	  something	  else,	  namely	  on	  a	  cause;	  but	  this	  dependence	  is	  indefinite,	  in	  the	   sense	   that	   the	   same	   effect	   can	   be	   produced	   by	   different	   individual	   causes.	  Brentano	   gives	   no	   example	   of	   the	   third	   kind	   of	   fundament,	   namely	   of	   an	   absolute	  entity	   with	   a	   definite	   ontological	   dependence	   on	   something	   else.	   The	   three	  aforementioned	   kinds	   of	   relations	   are	   analysed	   according	   to	   the	   distinct	   kinds	   of	  fundaments.	   The	   relations	   of	   comparison	   are	   founded	   upon	   absolute	   features	   that	  include	   no	   reference	   to	   anything	   else,	   such	   as	   colours	   or	   heights:	   every	   colour	   or	  height	  can	  exist	  without	  the	  other.	  The	  relation	  between	  the	  effect	  and	  the	  cause	  is	  founded	  upon	  something	  that	  needs	  something	  else	  to	  exist,	   like	  suffering	  (Leiden):	  every	  effect	  requires	  a	  cause.	  Now,	  what	  about	   the	   intentional	   relation?	  The	   text	   is	  not	  easy	  to	  understand⎯in	  particular	  the	  following	  two	  sentences:	  	  	   But	  what	  else	  could	  underlie	  here	  the	  one	  who	  is	  thinking	  except	  something	  absolute	  or	  something	  referring	  indefinitely?	  Certainly	  nothing;	  rather,	  it	  is	  always	  a	  particular	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modification	  of	  that	  which	  we	  call	  "thinking"	  that	  makes	  it	  be	  something	  thinking,	  and	  it	   can	   never	   happen,	   like	   it	   happens	   for	   the	   one	   who	   is	   taller,	   that,	   without	   itself	  undergoing	   a	   modification,	   it	   stops	   being	   taller	   because	   something	   else	   has	   been	  modified	   through	   growth.	   (Ms.	   Ps	   34,	   Von	   den	   Relationen,	   n°51043-­‐51044	  (13.05.1908);	  my	  translation)11	  	  	  It	   seems	   to	   me	   that	   Brentano	   establishes	   the	   following	   disjunction:	   either	   the	  intentional	  relation	  is	  founded	  upon	  something	  that	  is	  absolute	  in	  a	  strong	  sense,	  in	  other	  words	  upon	  something	  that	  does	  not	  include	  a	  reference	  to	  something	  else,	  or	  this	   relation	   is	   founded	   upon	   some	   absolute	   entity	   that	   includes	   an	   indefinite	  reference	  to	  something	  else.	   I	  suggest	  starting	  with	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  disjunction.	  Why	   does	   Brentano	   say	   that	   the	   intentional	   relation	   is	   founded	   upon	   something	  absolute	   in	   a	   strong	   sense,	   i.e.	   something	   that	   depends	   on	   nothing	   else	   for	   its	  existence?	  Brentano	  says	  that	  what	  makes	  something	  a	  thinking	  subject	  is	  always	  a	  particular	   modification	   (besondere	   Veränderung)	   of	   the	   subject.	   I	   believe	   what	   he	  wants	   to	   underscore	   in	   this	   text	   is	   that	   mental	   acts	   do	   not	   depend	   on	   something	  external	   for	   their	   occurrence,	   as	   is	   clear	   in	   cases	  where	  one	   thinks	  of	  non-­‐existent	  objects	  (impossibilia,	  hallucinations,	  etc.).	  Thus,	  a	  mental	  act	  is	  the	  combination	  of	  an	  absolute	  property	  dependent	  only	  on	  its	  subject	  and	  an	  intentional	  relation	  joined	  to	  this	   property.	   Now,	  what	   about	   the	   second	   part	   of	   the	   disjunction?	   In	  what	   sense	  could	  the	  intentional	  relation	  be	  founded	  upon	  some	  absolute	  entity	  that	  includes	  an	  indefinite	  reference	  to	  something	  else?	  In	  this	  text,	  indefinite	  reference	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  ontological	  dependence:	  everything	  referring	  indefinitely	  is	  dependent,	  for	  its	   existence,	   on	  any	   individual	  of	   a	   certain	   species.	  However,	   it	   seems	   clear	   that	   a	  mental	   act	   is	   never	   dependent,	   for	   its	   existence,	   on	   something	   else.	   Thus,	   when	  Brentano	   says	   that	   there	   is	   an	   indefinite	   reference	   of	   the	   fundament	   of	   the	  intentional	   relation	   to	   something	   else,	   he	   cannot	  mean	   that	   this	   fundament	  has	   an	  indefinite	  ontological	  dependence.	  In	  fact,	  Brentano	  explains	  later	  in	  the	  text	  how	  the	  indefinite	  reference	  should	  be	  understood:	  it	  simply	  means	  that	  the	  mental	  act	  can	  be	  directed	  upon	  indeterminate	  objects,	   i.e.	  universals.	  It	  does	  not	  mean,	   in	  opposition	  to	   the	   reference	   of	   the	   effect	   to	   some	   indeterminate	   cause,	   that	   the	   mental	   act	   is	  dependent,	  for	  its	  existence,	  on	  any	  individual	  of	  a	  certain	  species.	  Thus,	  in	  both	  parts	  of	   the	  disjunction,	   the	   intentional	  relation	   is	   founded	  upon	  an	  absolute	   feature	  that	  does	   not	   depend,	   for	   its	   existence,	   on	   something	   else.	   As	   regards	   the	   intentional	  relation	   itself,	   it	   occurs	   even	  when	  no	   term	  of	   the	   relation	   exists,	  which	   is	   not	   the	  case	   for	   the	   other	   relations.	   In	   consequence,	   Brentano	   says	   that	   the	   intentional	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11 	  “Aber	   was	   läge	   hier	   anderes	   dem	   Denkenden	   als	   absolutes	   oder	   nur	   unbestimmt	  
Hinweisendes	  unter?	  Offenbar	  nichts,	  vielmehr	  ist	  es	  immer	  eine	  besondere	  Veränderung	  dessen	  
was	   wir	   denkend	   nennen,	   die	   es	   zum	   Denkenden	  macht	   und	   nie	   kann	   es	   geschehen,	   dass	   es	  
ähnlich	   wie	   bei	   dem	   Grösseren	   geschieht,	   dass	   es	   ohne	   selbst	   ein<e>	   Änderung	   zu	   erfahren,	  
aufhört	  grösser	  zu	  sein,	  weil	  ein	  anderes	  durch	  Wachstum	  sich	  verändert	  hat.”	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relation	  is	  not	  a	  genuine	  or	  “true”	  relation	  (eine	  wahre	  Relation).	  Thus,	  in	  1908,	  as	  in	  1911,	  Brentano	  does	  not	  consider	  relations	  without	  a	  term	  to	  be	  genuine	  relations.	  But	  the	  grammar	  of	  intentionality	  is	  relational,	  since	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  text	  Brentano	  affirms	   that	   the	   presentation	   of	   a	   thinking	   subject	   entails	   the	   presentation	   of	   the	  object	  upon	  which	  the	  subject	  is	  directed,	  just	  as	  in	  1911.	  	  	  What	   should	   we	   conclude	   from	   this?	   It	   seems	   that	   Brentano	   distinguishes	   the	  intentional	  relation	  from	  the	  absolute	  features	  of	  the	  subject,	  even	  if	  this	  relation	  is	  not	  a	  genuine	  relation.	  Indeed,	  he	  says	  that	  this	  “relation”,	  like	  every	  other	  relation,	  is	  founded	   upon	   an	   absolute	   feature.	   Some	   pages	   later	   in	   the	   manuscript,	   while	  summarizing	  his	   theory	  of	   relatives,	  he	   reduces,	   from	  an	  ontological	  point	  of	   view,	  relatives	  of	  comparison	  to	  the	  absolute	  features	  of	  their	  bearers⎯in	  other	  words	  to	  the	   fundaments.	   But	   he	   does	   not	   speak	   about	   a	   similar	   reduction	   with	   respect	   to	  intentionality:	  	   2.	  Correlatives	  or	  correlates	  based	  on	  comparative-­‐type	  determination.	  Of	  that	  which	  is	  compared,	  each	  one	  of	  them	  can	  be	  something	  absolute.	  And	  when	  the	  comparative-­‐type	   determination	   is	   individual,	   thus	   it	   coincides,	   from	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   things,	  with	   the	   individual	  absolute	  one.	  But	   the	  correlative	  determinations	  commonly	  seem	  to	  be	  general.	  […]	  3.	  Thoughts	  of	  which	  the	  object	  is	  a	  thought.	  They	  are	  not	  possible	  without	  the	  object	  of	  this	  thought	  being	  also	  thought-­‐of.	  In	  reality,	  it	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  correlates	  here.	  The	  one	   thinking	   can	   be	   thought-­‐of	   as	   individual,	   whereas	   the	   object	   upon	   which	   it	   is	  directed	  is	  general,	  and	  this	  one	  does	  not	  really	  have	  to	  be	  in	  order	  to	  be	  an	  object	  for	  a	  real	  thinker.	  […]	  (Ms.	  Ps	  34,	  Von	  den	  Relationen,	  n°51058-­‐51060	  (13-­‐14.05.1908);	  my	  translation)12	  	  	  The	  fact	  that	  he	  does	  not	  speak	  about	  a	  reduction	  with	  respect	  to	  intentionality	  is	  not	  proof	  of	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  a	  reduction,	  but	  it	  is	  somehow	  a	  clue	  to	  it⎯I	  will	  come	  back	   to	   the	   question	   of	   the	   general	   reduction	   of	   relatives	   in	  Brentano	   later	   in	   this	  paper.	  However,	  one	  could	  consider	  this	  system	  very	  odd.	  Why	  should	  Brentano,	   in	  his	   theory	   of	   intentionality,	   require,	   beyond	   the	   absolute	   features	   of	   the	   subject,	   a	  non-­‐genuine	   relation	   to	   something	   else,	   a	   sui	   generis	   relation-­‐like	   entity?	  Unfortunately	  I	  do	  not	  have	  a	  clear	  answer	  to	  this	  question.	  Maybe	  Brentano	  wants	  his	   ontology	   to	   correspond	   to	   the	   grammar	   of	   intentionality,	   because	   of	   what	   A.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  “2.	   Correlativa	   oder	   Correlate	   auf	   vergleichsweiser	   Bestimmung	   beruhend.	  Was	   verglichen	  
wird,	   davon	   mag	   jedes	   etwas	   Absolutes	   sein.	   Und	   ist	   die	   vergleichsweise	   Bestimmung	  
individuell,	   so	   fällt	   sie	  mit	  den	   individuellen	  absoluten	   sachlich	  zusammen.	  Doch	   scheinen	  die	  
<c>orrelativen	  Bestimmungen	  gemeiniglich	  allgemeinen	  zu	  sein.	  […]	  3.	  Gedanken,	  deren	  Objekt	  
ein	  Denken	  ist.	  Sie	  sind	  nicht	  möglich	  ohne	  dass	  auch	  das	  Objekt	  dieses	  Denkens	  gedacht	  wird.	  
Um	  Correlate	  handelt	  es	  sich	  hier	  in	  Wahrheit	  nicht<.>	  Das	  Denkende	  kann	  individuell	  gedacht	  
werden,	  während	  das	  Objekt,	  auf	  welches	   es	   sich	  bezieht	  allgemein	   ist,	  und	  dieses	  muss	  nicht	  
wirklich	  sein,	  um	  Objekt	  eines	  wirklichen	  Denkens	  zu	  sein.	  […]”	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Chrudzimski	  calls	  Brentano’s	  “empiricism	  of	  concepts”	  (Begriffsempirismus),	  namely	  the	   theory	   advocating	   that	   our	   concepts	   are	   all	   derived	   from	   concrete	   empirical	  intuitions	   (Chrudzimski	   2001,	   p.	   71–74).	   Thus,	   if	   we	   have,	   grammatically,	   an	  irreducible	  concept	  of	  a	   relation	  without	  a	   term,	  which	  cannot	  be	   translated	   into	  a	  concept	   referring	   to	   an	   already-­‐known	   reality⎯for	   example	   into	   a	   concept	   of	  something	   absolute⎯,	   then	   this	   irreducible	   concept	   must	   come	   from	   a	   concrete	  empirical	   intuition⎯in	   other	   words	   from	   something	   real	   that	   has	   this	   odd	  ontological	  structure.	  Thus,	  in	  1908,	  the	  relational-­‐like	  intentional	  relation	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  sui	  generis	  entity,	  distinct	  from	  the	  absolute	  features	  of	  the	  subject.	  	  	  
Reversal:	  Relations	  (Relatives)	  Without	  Terms	  	  Apparently,	   in	   1908,	   and	   probably	   in	   1911,	   intentionality	   is	   neither	   a	   genuine	  relation	  nor	  an	  absolute	   feature	  of	   the	   subject,	  but	  a	  sui	  generis	   relation-­‐like	  entity	  founded	   upon	   an	   absolute	   feature.	   Brentano’s	   reason	   for	   rejecting	   the	   relational	  aspect	  of	  intentionality	  is	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  term	  for	  some	  mental	  acts.	  In	  other	  words,	  Brentano,	   in	  1908	  and	  1911,	   considers	  an	  entity	   to	  be	   relative	  only	   if	   its	   existence	  implies	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  term.	  But	  I	  believe	  things	  change	  in	  1915-­‐1916.	  Indeed,	  in	  his	   last	   texts	   (Brentano	  died	   in	  1917),	  Brentano	  affirms	   that	   there	  can	  be	   relatives	  without	  existent	  terms:	  
 It	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  terminus	  to	  which	  the	  relative	  determination	  relates	  need	  not	  always	  to	  exist	  in	  order	  for	  the	  relative	  determination	  to	  exist.	  This	  is	  obviously	  the	  case	  with	  the	  intentional	  relation	  between	  the	  one	  who	  is	  presenting	  and	  that	  which	  he	  presents,	  between	  the	  one	  who	  is	  denying	  and	  that	  which	  he	  denies,	  and	  between	  the	  one	  who	  is	  desiring	  and	  that	  which	  he	  desires.	  (Kategorienlehre,	  p.	  283	  (29.03.1916);	  transl.	  R.	  M.	  Chisholm,	  N.	  Guterman,	  p.	  200,	  slightly	  modified)13	  	  	  The	   text	   of	   Kategorienlehre	   p.	   237–238	   quoted	   above	   also	   shows	   this.	   In	   fact,	   in	  1915–1916,	  many	  relatives,	   for	  Brentano,	  are	  relatives	  without	   terms;	  and	   they	  are	  genuine	  relatives.	  The	  causal	  relatives,	  opposed	  in	  1908	  and	  1911	  to	  the	  intentional	  relative-­‐like	   entities,	   are	   in	   1915–1916	   no	   longer	   considered	   to	   be	   necessarily	  directed	   upon	   an	   existent	   term;	   and	   they	   are	   still	   genuine	   relatives.	   In	   the	  aforementioned	  text	  of	  Kategorienlehre,	  p.	  237–238,	  Brentano	  says	  that	  the	  cause	  of	  an	  aftereffect	  (Nachwirkung)	  can	  be	  non-­‐existent	  when	  the	  aftereffect	  occurs.	  In	  brief,	  there	  is	  a	  reversal	  in	  Brentano’s	  ontology	  of	  relatives.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 	  “Es	   ist	   klar,	   dass	   nicht	   immer	   der	   Terminus,	   zu	   welchem	   die	   relative	   Bestimmung	   in	  
Beziehung	   setzt,	   bestehen	  muss,	   damit	  die	   relative	  Bestimmung	   selbst	  Bestand	  habe.	   So	  ganz	  
offenbar	   bei	   der	   intentionalen	   Beziehung	   des	   Vorstellenden	   zu	   dem,	   was	   er	   vorstellt,	   des	  
Leugnenden	  zu	  dem,	  was	  er	   leugnet,	  des	  Begehrenden	  zu	  dem,	  was	  er	  begehrt.”	  (From	  Ms.	  M	  89,	  Über	  die	  Kategorien,	  n°31051;	  no	  modifications.)	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  Brentano’s	  reversal	  concerning	  relatives	  is	  often	  thought	  to	  be	  established	  in	  a	  text	  of	  the	   Kategorienlehre	   called	   “On	   that	   which	   is	   relative	   to	   something”	   (Von	   dem	   zu	  
Etwas	  sich	  Verhaltenden;	  p.	  166–176	  of	  the	  book,	  more	  specifically	  p.	  169):	  	  
 The	  question	  is	  easily	  answered	  if	  we	  take	  care	  to	  avoid	  mere	  verbal	  disputes	  and	  if	  we	  attend	  to	  the	  distinctive	  characteristic	  which	  holds	  of	  all	  relational	  thinking.	  Whether	  this	  thinking	  is	  merely	  presentational,	  or	  whether	  it	   involves	  judgment	  or	  emotion,	   it	  always	  involves	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  presentations,	  a	  presentation	  having	  different	  modes.	  One	  thing	  is	  presented	  in	  modo	  recto	  and	  another	  in	  modo	  obliquo.	  
The	  thing	  presented	  in	  modo	  recto	  must	  exist,	  if	  the	  relation	  is	  to	  exist,	  but	  not	  the	  thing	  
presented	   in	   modo	   obliquo⎯except	   in	   some	   special	   cases,	   for	   example	   someone	  acknowledging	  with	   evidence	   cannot	   exist	   unless	   the	   thing	   that	   is	   acknowledged	   by	  him	  also	  exists.	  Thus	   we	   have	   succeeded	   in	   finding	   the	   unitary	   concept	   we	   were	   looking	   for	   all	  relatives:	   when	   we	   are	   concerned	   with	   that	   which	   is	   relative	   to	   something,	   we	   are	  concerned	  with	  nothing	  other	  than	  determinations	  which	  are	  such	  that,	  in	  presenting	  them,	  one	  presents	   something	   in	  recto	   and	   something	   in	  obliquo.	  (Kategorienlehre,	   p.	  169;	  transl.	  R.	  M.	  Chisholm,	  N.	  Guterman,	  p.	  127,	  modified)14	  
 
 However,	  this	  text	  is	  a	  construction	  of	  Kastil’s.	  Indeed,	  Kastil	  combines	  two	  different	  manuscripts,	   namely	   the	   manuscript	   Ps	   8,	   “Von	   dem	   zu	   Etwas	   sich	   Verhaltenden”,	  dated	   January	   1915,	   and	   the	  manuscript	  M	   76,	   Zur	   “Metaphysik”,	   dated	   December	  1915	  (see	  Appendix	  2a	  and	  2b).	  The	  text	  of	  the	  Kategorienlehre	  seems	  to	  say	  that	  the	  requirement	   of	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   term	   should	  be	   rejected	   for	   all	   relatives.	   Indeed,	  after	   having	   rejected	   this	   requirement	   for	   the	   intentional	   relatives,	   the	   text	   says:	  “Thus	  we	  have	  succeeded	  in	  finding	  the	  unitary	  concept	  we	  were	  looking	  for	  for	  all	  relatives”	   (Und	   damit	   haben	  wir	   auch	   schon	   den	   gesuchten	   einheitlichen	   Begriff	   für	  
alles	   Relative	   gefunden).	   Now,	   this	   sentence,	   that	   Kastil	   uses	   to	   link	   two	   passages	  from	  the	  two	  different	  manuscripts,	  is	  very	  probably	  his	  own	  work,	  since	  it	  is	  absent	  from	   both	  manuscripts.	   In	   the	  manuscript	  M	   76,	   right	   before	   the	   passage	   used	   by	  Kastil,	  Brentano	  talks	  about	  relatives	  of	  comparison,	  and	  seems	  to	  say	  that	   they	  do	  not	   always	   require	   a	   term.	   Right	   after	   the	   passage,	   the	  manuscript	   contains	   a	   text	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  “Die	  Frage	  löst	  sich	  leicht,	  wenn	  man	  Sorge	  trägt,	  allen	  Wortstreit	  zu	  vermeiden	  und	  auf	  die	  
Eigentümlichkeit	  achtet,	  welche	  dem	  beziehenden	  Denken	  allgemein	  zukommt.	  Mag	  dieses	  ein	  
bloss	   vorstellendes	   oder	   auch	   ein	   urteilendes	   oder	   sich	   gemütlich	   beziehendes	   sein,	   immer	  
handelt	   es	   sich	   dabei	   um	   eine	  Mehrheit	   von	   Vorstellen,	   um	   ein	   Vorstellen	  mit	   verschiedenen	  
Modis.	  Es	  wird	  ein	  Ding	  in	  modo	  recto	  und	  eines	  in	  modo	  obliquo	  vorgestellt.	  Das	  in	  modo	  recto	  Vorgestellte	  muss	   sein,	  wenn	  das	  Relative	   sein	   soll,	   das	   in	  modo	  obliquo	  Vorgestellte	   aber	  nicht,	   ausser	   in	  ganz	  besonderen	  Fällen,	  wie	  z.	  B.	   ein	  evident	  Anerkennender	  nicht	   sein	  kann,	  
ohne	   dass	   das	   von	   ihm	   anerkannte	   Ding	   existiert.	   Und	   damit	   haben	   wir	   auch	   schon	   den	  
gesuchten	   einheitlichen	  Begriff	   für	   alles	  Relative	   gefunden:	  Es	   handelt	   sich	  bei	   dem	  zu	   etwas	  
sich	   Verhaltenden	   um	   nichts	   anderes	   als	   um	   solche	   Bestimmungen,	   wo	  man,	   indem	  man	   sie	  
vorstellt,	  etwas	  in	  recto	  und	  etwas	  in	  obliquo	  vorstellt.”	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edited	  by	  Kastil	  five	  pages	  later	  in	  his	  book	  (p.	  174;	  I	  will	  quote	  this	  text	  below).	  The	  second	  part	  of	   the	   text	  comes	   from	  the	  manuscript	  Ps	  8.	  The	  manuscript	   says	  only	  that	   some	   relatives	   probably	   do	   not	   require	   a	   term.	   Thus,	   even	   if	   in	   these	  manuscripts	  Brentano	  is	  saying	  that	  intentional	  relatives	  and	  relatives	  of	  comparison	  do	  not	  require	  a	  term,	  he	  does	  not	  explicitly	  apply	  this	  to	  all	  relatives,	  and	  nor	  does	  he	   talk	   about	   a	   “unitary	   concept”	   (einheitlicher	   Begriff).	   In	   brief,	   the	   text	   of	  
Kategorienlehre,	  p.	  169,	   is	  not	  as	  decisive	  as	   it	   looks.	   It	   is	  useful	  to	  emend	  this	  text,	  since	  scholars	  quote	  it	  frequently.15	  Nevertheless,	  despite	  this	  emendation,	  the	  other	  texts	   I	   have	  mentioned,	   namely	  Kategorienlehre,	   p.	   237–238	  and	  p.	   283,	   show	   that	  Brentano	  changed	  his	  ontology	  of	  relatives	  around	  1915:	  here,	  many	  relatives	  lack	  an	  existent	  term,	  and	  they	  are	  genuine	  relatives.	  	  	  	  
Rejection	  of	  Relations	  (Relatives)?	  	  Of	  course,	  even	  if	  Brentano	  apparently	  admits	  these	  odd	  relatives	  without	  terms,	  one	  could	   object	   that	   this	   reversal	   does	   not	   imply	   that	   these	   relatives	   are	   real.	   A	  counterargument	  could	  be	  that	  Brentano	  generally	  thinks	  that	  relatives	  are	  not	  real.	  This	  would	  somehow	  save	  Brentano:	  since	  in	  general,	  Brentano	  is	  not	  a	  realist	  about	  relatives,	  he	  does	  not	  admit	  these	  odd	  real	  relatives	  without	  terms.	  Brentano’s	  anti-­‐realism	  with	  regard	  to	  relations	  is	  defended	  by	  B.	  Smith	  and	  A.	  Chrudzimski	  (Smith	  1994,	   p.	   100–102;	   Chrudzimski	   2004,	   p.	   183–188).	   Smith	   thinks	   that	   relations	   in	  Brentano,	   or	   “relative	   determinations”	   (relative	   Bestimmungen),	   are	   not	   real	  accidents,	   but	   are	   instead	   subjective	   (at	   least	   according	   to	   Brentano’s	   “official	  theory”;	   i.e.	   Smith	   recognizes	   that	   there	   seem	   to	   be	   passages	   in	   which	   Brentano	  defends	  a	  realist	  position	  on	  relations).	  Smith	  says	  that	  a	  relative	  determination,	  for	  Brentano,	   is	   a	   point	   of	   view	   on	   something.	   Thus,	   I	   can	   either	   present	   something	  absolute	  as	  the	  absolute	  it	  really	  is,	  or	  I	  can	  present	  it	  as	  a	  relative,	  i.e.	  I	  can	  mentally	  link	   it	   to	   something	   else.	   Smith	   claims	   to	   follow	   Marty’s	   correct	   interpretation	   of	  Brentano’s	  (“official”)	  theory.	  Now,	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  Smith	  misunderstands	  Marty.	  Indeed,	  Marty,	  in	  Raum	  und	  Zeit,	  says	  that	  relations	  in	  Brentano	  are	  not	  real.	  But	  he	  does	  not	  affirm	  that	  they	  are	  subjective;	  rather	  he	  says	  that	  they	  are	  objective	  modes	  of	  presentation	  (Vorstellungsmodi).	  This	  means	  that	  relations,	  in	  Brentano,	  are	  ways	  of	  presenting	  two	  entities	  as	  linked	  together,	  according	  to	  the	  modes	  of	  presentation	  
in	   recto	   and	   in	  obliquo,	   but	  with	   the	   possibility	   of	   having	   true	   or	   false	   judgements	  based	   on	   these	   complex	   presentations.	   The	   possibility	   of	   true	   or	   false	   judgements	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  See	  Gilson	  1955,	  p.	  139,	  who	  studies	   in	  detail	  Brentano’s	  evolution	  concerning	   relatives,	  and	   rightly	   insists	   on	   the	   admission,	   by	  Brentano,	   of	   real	   relatives	  without	   existent	   terms;	  Smith	  1994,	  p.	  100;	  Chrudzimski	  2001,	  p.	  239;	  Sauer	  2006,	  p.	  21,	  who	  briefly	  presents	   the	  evolution	  of	  Brentano	  concerning	   relatives;	  Antonelli	  2011,	  p.	  XLVI.	  Probably	   that	   the	   first	  author	  who	  identified	  a	  reversal	  in	  Brentano's	  theory	  of	  relatives	  was	  O.	  Kraus,	  but	  he	  did	  it	  before	  Kastil's	  edition	  of	  the	  Kategorienlehre	  (see	  Kraus	  1924,	  p.	  XXIV-­‐XL).	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would	   not	   be	   given	   if	   relations	   were	   subjective	   (Marty	   1916,	   p.	   148–150).	   Thus,	  Smith’s	   interpretation	   of	   Marty	   is	   not	   correct.	   Moreover,	   and	   above	   all,	   Brentano	  refuses	  the	  anti-­‐realist	  interpretation	  Marty	  makes.	  He	  says	  clearly	  to	  Kraus	  that	  it	  is	  wrong	   to	   consider	   relations⎯or,	   in	   reistic	   terms,	   “relatives”⎯to	   be	   modes	   of	  presentation	   (Vorstellungsmodi);	   on	   the	   contrary,	   he	   strongly	   affirms	   that	   they	   are	  real:	  
 So,	  according	  to	  me,	  a	  relation	  (I	  would	  prefer	  to	  say	  a	  relative)	  would	  not	  be	  an	  object	  of	  presentation,	  but	  a	  peculiar	  mode	  of	  presentation.	  This	  is	  perfectly	  false.	  A	  relative	  can	  be	  presented	  in	  modo	  recto	  and	  in	  modo	  obliquo,	  like	  an	  absolute.	  Moreover,	  it	  can	  have	  existence,	  as	  it	  is	  the	  case	  for	  an	  absolute;	  indeed,	  I	  include	  it	  in	  reality,	  as	  it	  is	  the	  case	  for	  an	  absolute.	  The	  relative	  is	  not	  a	  mode	  of	  presentation;	  but	  what	  is	  true	  is	  that	  the	   one	   who	   is	   presenting	   the	   fundament	   of	   a	   relative	   in	   modo	   recto	   presents	   its	  correlative	   terminus	   in	   modo	   obliquo.	   (Die	   Abkehr	   vom	   Nichtrealen,	   p.	   310-­‐311	  (05.07.1916);	  my	  translation)16	  	  	  It	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  this	  text	  from	  July	  1916	  is	  proof	  of	  Brentano’s	  realism	  concerning	  relations.	   However,	   this	   seems	   to	   contradict	   some	   of	   his	   other	   texts,	   in	   which	   he	  questions	  the	  reality	  of	  relations.	  Brentano	  says	  that	  something	  can	  become	  relative	  or	   stop	   being	   relative	   through	   a	   modification	   occurring	   in	   something	   else;	   he	  mentions	   this	   point	   in	   a	   text	   of	   the	   Kategorienlehre,	   p.	   120–121,	   quoted	   by	  Chrudzimski	   (Chrudzimski	   2004,	   p.	   184	   n.	   177).	   As	   such,	   one	   could	   infer	   that	  Brentano	   rejects	   the	   reality	   of	   relatives,	   since	   these	   entities	   do	   not	   fall	   under	   the	  criterion	   of	   causality	   that	   defines	   reality:	   real	   entities	   have	   proper	   generation	   and	  corruption	   and	   can	   enter	   by	   themselves	   into	   causal	   interactions,	   whereas	   unreal	  entities	  have	  generation	  and	  corruption	  depending	  on	  the	  generation	  and	  corruption	  of	  something	  else,	  and	  cannot	  enter	  by	  themselves	  into	  causal	  interactions.17	  Yet	  we	  cannot	   be	   certain	   that	   Brentano	   thinks,	   in	   his	   last	   texts,	   that	   something	   becomes	  relative	  or	  stops	  being	  relative	   through	  a	  modification	  occurring	   in	  something	  else.	  Indeed,	   he	   admits	   that	   some	   relative	   entities,	   namely	   comparative	   relatives	   and	  intentional	  relatives,	  subsist	  even	  if	  their	  correlate	  changes	  or	  disappears:	  
	  In	  many	  cases	   the	   linguistic	  expression	  concerning	  relativa	   says	  more	   than	   the	  mere	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16 	  “So	   soll	   nach	   mir	   eine	   Relation	   (ich	   würde	   lieber	   sagen	   ein	   Relatives)	   kein	  
Vorstellungsgegenstand,	  sondern	  ein	  besonderer	  Modus	  des	  Vorstellens	  sein.	  Dies	   ist	  durchaus	  
falsch.	   Ein	   Relatives	   kann	   in	   modo	   recto	   und	   in	   modo	   obliquo	   vorgestellt	   werden,	   wie	   ein	  
Absolutes.	  Auch	  kommt	  ihm	  Existenz	  zu,	  wie	  einem	  Absoluten,	  ja	  ich	  rechne	  es	  wie	  ein	  Absolutes	  
zum	   Realen.	   Nicht	   das	   Relative	   ist	   ein	   Modus	   des	   Vorstellens;	   wahr	   ist	   nur,	   dass,	   wer	   das	  
Fundament	  eines	  Relativen	  in	  modo	  recto,	  den	  ihm	  korrelativen	  Terminus	  in	  obliquo	  vorstellt.”	  17	  On	   this	   definition	   of	   reality	   in	   Brentano,	   see	   Brentano	   Ms.	   Ps	   34,	   Von	   den	   Relationen,	  n°51075	   (undated	   part),	   Ms.	   M	   74,	   Das	   Seiende	   (für	   Marty),	   n°30867	   (undated),	   and	  Brentano	  2013,	  p.	  466-­‐467,	  already	  discussed	  before	  its	  publication	  in	  Chrudzimski	  2004,	  p.	  138–139.	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relating,	   since	   it	   also	   expresses	   the	   acknowledgement	   of	   something	   that	   lies	   outside	  that	  which	  is	  thought	  of	  in	  modo	  recto.	  This	  is	  what	  happens	  if	  I	  say	  “Caius	  is	  taller	  than	  Titus”	  which	  comes	  to	  the	  same	  thing	  as	  “Caius	  is	  taller	  than	  Titus	  is.”	  Just	  this	  fact,	  that	  an	   assertion	   is	   here	   being	   made	   about	   something	   outside	   the	   subject,	   leads	   one	   to	  suppose	  that	  the	  relative	  attribute	  were	  lost	  without	  there	  being	  a	  modification	  in	  the	  subject.	  But	   this	   illusion	   is	  dispelled	  once	  we	  have	  brought	   into	   clear	   focus	   the	  pure	  relative	  attribute.	  	  But	   with	   this	   also	   disappears	   all	   motivation	   for	   refusing	   to	   consider	   the	   relative	  determinations	   that	   we	   ascribe	   to	   things	   as	   real	   as	   every	   absolute	   one.	  (Kategorienlehre,	  p.	  174	  (16.12.1915);	  transl.	  R.	  M.	  Chisholm,	  N.	  Guterman,	  p.	  130–131,	  modified)18	  	  	   Aristotle	  himself	  allows	  one	  exception,	  for	  he	  says,	  with	  respect	  to	  one	  of	  his	  classes	  of	  relations,	  that	  it	  is	  real	  but	  that	  it	  does	  not	  have	  a	  real	  correlate.	  Here	  he	  is	  speaking	  of	  the	  relation	  of	  the	  one	  who	  is	  thinking	  to	  that	  which	  is	  thought.	  That	  which	  is	  thought	  is	   merely	   an	   ens	   rationis.	   When	   we	   consider	   this	   accurately,	   thus,	   what	   Aristotle	  affirms	   concerning	   the	   other	   classes	   does	   not	   hold	   for	   this	   one	   –	   namely,	   that	   the	  relative	   attribute	   can	   come	   into	   being	   or	   pass	   away	   without	   there	   being	   any	  modification	  of	  the	  subject.	  To	  be	  sure,	  that	  which	  the	  one	  who	  is	  thinking	  thinks	  need	  not	  exist.	  This	  is	  obvious	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  thinker	  who	  denies	  something	  with	  evidence,	  for	   this	   case	   rules	   out	   the	   being	   of	   the	   thing	   denied.	   (Kategorienlehre,	   p.	   167-­‐168	  (16.12.1915);	  transl.	  R.	  M.	  Chisholm,	  N.	  Guterman,	  p.	  126,	  modified)19	  	  	  In	  a	  letter	  to	  Kraus	  (3th	  of	  April	  1915),	  Brentano	  affirms	  that	  Gaius	  is	  still	  taller	  than	  Titus	   when	   Titus	   disappears,	   since	   Gaius	   is	   still	   taller	   than	   Titus	   was	   when	   the	  comparison	  was	  made	  (Brentano	  1977,	  p.	  284–285).	  The	   idea	  seems	  to	  be	  that	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  “Der	  sprachliche	  Ausdruck	  für	  Relativa	  besagt	  in	  vielen	  Fällen	  mehr	  als	  das	  blosse	  Beziehen,	  
indem	   er	   nämlich	   auch	   die	   Anerkennung	   von	   etwas	   ausspricht,	   was	   ausserhalb	   des	   in	  modo	  
recto	  Gedachten	  liegt.	  So	  ist	  es,	  wenn	  ich	  sage,	  „Cajus	  ist	  grösser	  als	  Titus“,	  was	  ja	  so	  viel	  heisst	  
wie	  „Cajus	  ist	  grösser,	  als	  Titus	  ist“.	  Eben	  dieser	  Umstand,	  dass	  hier	  noch	  über	  etwas	  ausserhalb	  
des	  Subjektes	  eine	  Aussage	  gemacht	  wird,	  erzeugt	  den	  Anschein,	  als	  ginge	  das	  relative	  Attribut	  
verloren	  ohne	  Änderung	  am	  Subjekte.	  Sobald	  wir	  aber	  das,	  was	  bloss	  relatives	  Attribut	  ist,	  rein	  
herausheben,	   verschwindet	   dieser	   Schein.	   Damit	   entfällt	   aber	   auch	   jedes	  Motiv,	   die	   relativen	  
Bestimmungen,	   die	   wir	   den	   Dingen	   beilegen,	   nicht	   ebensogut	   als	   reale	   gelten	   zu	   lassen	   wie	  
irgend	  eine	  Absolute.”	  (From	  Ms.	  M	  76,	  Zur	  “Metaphysik”,	  n°30878;	   important	  modifications.	  However,	  Kastil’s	  edition	   is	   faithful	   to	   the	  meaning	  of	   the	  manuscript;	   for	   the	  original	   text,	  see	  Appendix	  3.)	  19	  “Aristoteles	   selbst	   lässt	   von	   dem	   Satze	   eine	   Ausnahme	   gelten,	   indem	   er	   von	   einer	   seiner	  
Relationsklassen	   lehrt,	   dass	   sie	   zwar	   real	   sei,	   aber	   kein	   reales	   Korrelat	   habe.	   Es	   ist	   dies	   die	  
Relation	  des	  Denkenden	  zum	  Gedachten.	  Das	  Gedachte	  ist	  ja	  bloss	  ens	  rationis.	  Sieht	  man	  genau	  
zu,	  so	  gilt	  von	  dieser	  Klasse	  nicht,	  was	  Aristoteles	  von	  den	  andern	  behauptet,	  dass	  das	  relative	  
Attribut	   ohne	   Änderung	   am	   Subjekt	   entstehen	   oder	   vergehen	   könne.	   Das,	  was	   das	   Denkende	  
denkt,	  braucht	  ja	  nicht	  zu	  sein.	  Recht	  klar	  tritt	  das	  hervor	  im	  Falle,	  wo	  ein	  Denkendes	  etwas	  mit	  
Evidenz	   leugnet.	   Hier	   ist	   ja	   das	   Sein	   des	   Geleugneten	   ausgeschlossen.”	   (From	  Ms.	   M	   76,	   Zur	  
“Metaphysik”,	  n°30876-­‐30877;	   important	  modifications.	  However,	  Kastil’s	  edition	   is	   faithful	  to	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  manuscript;	  for	  the	  original	  text,	  see	  Appendix	  4.)	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disappearance	  of	  Titus	  does	  not	  make	  Gaius	  shorter	  or	  taller	  than	  something	  having	  the	   height	   that	   Titus	   had	   before	   he	   disappeared.	   As	   for	   the	   intentional	   relation,	   it	  does	  not	  disappear	  when	  the	  object	  changes,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  I	  can	  continue	  to	  think	  of	  something	  as	  such	  and	  such	  even	  if	  it	  undergoes	  change	  and	  is	  not	  such	  anymore.	  Moreover,	  I	  think	  that	  Brentano	  abandoned	  the	  causal	  definition	  of	  reality	  during	  his	  reistic	   period,	   and	   thought	   that	   the	   concept	   of	   reality	   was	   a	   primitive	   concept.	   In	  another	   letter	   to	   Kraus	   (8th	   of	   November	   1914),	   Brentano	   affirms	   that	   Marty	   is	  wrong	   when	   he	   says	   that	   “real”	   is	   equivalent	   to	   “able	   to	   have	   a	   causal	   effect”	  (Wirkungskräftig).	   Indeed,	   reality,	   or	   “thing”,	   Ding,	   is	   the	   highest	   and	   simplest	  concept,	  and	  cannot	  be	  analysed	  by	  using	  a	  particular	  accidental	  category,	  which,	  as	  every	  accidental	  category,	  is	  subordinated	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  reality	  (Brentano	  1930,	  p.	   107–109	   and	   1977,	   p.	   250–252).	   Thus,	   the	   concept	   of	   reality	   does	   not	   include	  causality	  as	  a	  logical	  part.	  In	  sum,	  even	  if	  the	  acquisition	  or	  loss	  of	  a	  relation	  occurs	  without	   any	   causal	   influence	   on	   its	   bearer,	   it	   is	   not	   certain	   that	   this	   fact	   would	  exclude	  its	  reality	  for	  the	  later	  Brentano.	  	  Now,	  there	  are	  other	  arguments	  against	  the	  admission	  of	  relations	  in	  Brentano.	  One	  could	   say	   that	  Brentano	   is	   a	  moderate	   realist	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   relations:	   relations	  are	   real,	   but	   reducible	   to	   absolute	   features	   of	   their	   bearers.	   Indeed,	   Brentano	  sometimes	   says	   himself	   that	   relatives	   are	   constituted	   by	   nothing	   more	   than	   a	  collection	   of	   absolute	   features,	   for	   example	   in	   the	   aforementioned	   text	   of	   the	  
Kategorienlehre,	  p.	  120–121.	  Now,	  Kastil	  argues,	  in	  the	  notes	  of	  his	  edition,	  that	  this	  text	  is	  part	  of	  Brentano’s	  antepenultimate	  theory	  of	  categories⎯the	  ultimate	  theory	  being	   that	   of	   1916.20	  I	   agree	   with	   this	   chronology.	   Indeed,	   I	   believe	   that	   in	   1916	  Brentano	  refuses	  to	  reduce	  all	  relations	  to	  absolute	  features	  of	  their	  bearers.	  In	  the	  manuscript	   M	   76,	   Zur	   “Metaphysik”,	   of	   December	   1915,	   Brentano	   argues	   that	  relations⎯or	   “relative	   determinations”	   (relative	   Bestimmungen)⎯are	   real,	   but	  reducible	   to	   the	   categories	   of	   the	   absolute	   accidents	   on	  which	   they	   depend.	   Thus,	  they	  do	  not	  form	  a	  proper	  category	  of	  accidents:	  	  
 It	   follows	   from	   that	   which	   has	   already	   been	   discussed	   that	   even	   if	   the	   relative	  determinations	  are	  as	   real	  as	   the	  absolute	  one,	  no	  definite	   class	  of	   relative	  accidents	  should	   be	   admitted.	   (Ms.	   M	   76,	   Zur	   “Metaphysik”,	   n°30888	   (16.12.1915);	   my	  translation)21	  
	  	  Neither	  for	  the	  "How	  tall?",	  nor	  for	  the	  "Where?",	  nor	  for	  the	  "When?",	  nor	  for	  doing,	  nor	  for	  wearing,	  nor	  for	  the	  position,	  nor	  for	  the	  relation	  should	  definite	  categories	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  See	  Kastil	  1933,	  p.	  336	  (n.	  1	  of	  p.	  113),	  p.	  334	  (n.	  1	  of	  p.	  101)	  and	  p.	  349	  (n.	  1	  of	  p.	  153).	  
21 	  “Aus	   dem	   bereits	   Erörterten	   ergibt	   sich,	   dass	   wie	   immer	   die	   relativen	   Bestimmungen	  
ebensogut	  real	  sind,	  wie	  die	  absoluten,	  doch	  keine	  besondere	  Klasse	  von	  relativen	  Akzidenzien	  
angenommen	  werden	  darf.”	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admitted.	  (Ms.	  M	  76,	  Zur	  “Metaphysik”,	  n°30896	  (16.12.1915);	  my	  translation)22	  	  	  It	   is	   false	   to	  consider	   relative	  determinations	   to	  be	  non	  real	  determinations,	  but	   it	   is	  also	  false	  to	  consider	  them	  to	  be	  	  real	  determinations	  from	  another	  category	  than	  the	  absolute	  to	  which	  they	  belong	  […].	  (Ms.	  M	  76,	  Zur	  “Metaphysik”,	  n°30906	  (16.12.1915);	  my	  translation)23	  	  	  But	   in	  1916,	   in	  a	   text	  published	   in	   the	  Kategorienlehre,	  p.	  239–242,	   taken	   from	  the	  manuscript	  M	  88,	  Über	  die	  Kategorien,	  of	  March	  1916,	  Brentano	  affirms	  that	  relative	  determinations	  do	  form	  a	  proper	  category	  of	  accidents.	  Indeed,	  he	  talks	  of	  “relative	  accidental	  determinations”	  (relative	  akzidentelle	  Bestimmungen);	  and	  this	  expression	  is	  not	  Kastil’s	   (see	  Brentano	  Ms.	  M	  88,	  Über	  die	  Kategorien,	  n°31008	  (02.03.1916)).	  Thus,	  Brentano	  rejects	  what	  he	  defended	  in	  1915,	  and	  now	  admits	  proper	  classes	  of	  relational	  accidents.	  This	  seems	  to	  me	  to	  forgo	  any	  general	  reduction	  of	  relations	  in	  Brentano’s	  philosophy.	  Moreover,	  in	  a	  text	  of	  1916	  published	  in	  the	  Kategorienlehre,	  Brentano	   gives	   the	   following	   list	   of	   relations:	   categorial,	   causal,	   boundary,	  intentional,	   and	   comparative	   relations.	   Then,	   he	   says	   that	   the	   last	   class,	   that	   of	  relations	  of	  comparison,	  is	  reducible	  to	  absolute	  properties	  of	  the	  bearer⎯a	  relation	  of	  comparison	  is	  nothing	  more	  than	  an	  absolute	  property	  given	  in	  an	  indeterminate	  way	  (for	  example,	   'shorter	   than	  1m	  85'	   is	  a	  height	  given	   in	  an	   indeterminate	  way).	  Thus,	  by	  contrast,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  for	  the	  other	  classes	  of	  relations:  
 These	  modes	  of	  real	  relation	  further	  include	  the	  previously	  mentioned	  relations	  of	  the	  one	   who	   is	   suffering	   to	   the	   agent,	   of	   boundary	   to	   bounded,	   and	   of	   the	   one	   who	   is	  thinking	  to	  that	  which	  is	  thought.	  Comparative	  determinations	  were	  also	  possible	  in	  all	  cases.	   They	   coincided,	   when	   one	   discounted	   the	   denominationes	   extrinsecae	   they	  contained,	   with	   the	   substantial	   or	   accidental	   reality	   which	   is	   underlying	   them	   as	  fundament,	   just	   as	   the	   reality	   of	   a	   universal	   determination	   coincides	   with	   the	  individual	   reality.	   (Kategorienlehre,	   p.	   259	   (02.03.1916);	   transl.	   R.	   M.	   Chisholm,	   N.	  Guterman,	  p.	  185,	  modified)24	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  “Weder	   für	  das	  "Wie	  gross?"<,>	  noch	   für	  das	  "Wo?"<,>	  noch	   für	  das	  "Wann?",	  noch	   für	  das	  
Tun,	   noch	   für	   das	   Anhaben,	   noch	   für	   die	   Lage,	   noch	   für	   die	   Relation	   sind	   eigene	   Kategorien	  
anzunehmen.”	  	  23	  “Dass	  die	  relativen	  Bestimmungen	  nicht	  reale	  Bestimmungen	  seien,	  ist	  falsch,	  aber	  auch,	  dass	  
sie	  reale	  Bestimmungen	  von	  anderer	  Kategorie	  seien,	  als	  das	  Absolute,	  dem	  sie	  zukommen	  […].”	  24	  “Zu	  diesen	  Weisen	  realer	  Beziehung	  kommen	  dann	  noch	  die	  schon	  genannten	  des	  Leidenden	  
zum	   Tuenden,	   der	   Grenze	   zum	   Begrenzten	   und	   des	   Denkenden	   zum	   Gedachten.	   Die	  
Vergleichsbestimmungen	   waren	   auch	   überall	   möglich.	   Sie	   fielen,	   wenn	  man	   von	   dem	   absah,	  
was	   sie	   von	  denominatio	   extrinseca	  enthielten,	  mit	  dem	   ihnen	  als	  Fundament	  unterliegenden	  
substanziellen	  oder	  akzidentellen	  Realen	  zusammen,	  ähnlich	  wie	  das	  Reale	  einer	  universellen	  
Bestimmung	  mit	  der	   individuellen	  Realität.”	   (From	  Ms.	  M	   88,	  Über	  die	  Kategorien,	   n°31025	  (02.03.1916);	  no	  important	  modifications.)	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Thus,	  since	   in	  1916	  relations	  without	  terms	  are	  admitted,	  since	  they	  are	  real,	  since	  relations	   constitute	   a	   proper	   accidental	   category,	   and	   since	   only	   comparative	  relations	   are	   reducible	   to	   absolute	   features	   of	   their	   bearer,	   it	   becomes	   difficult	   to	  explain	   how	   the	   intentional	   relation	   could	   be	   anything	   other	   than	   a	   non-­‐reducible	  real	  relation.	  	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	  Brentano’s	   last	   theory	  of	   intentionality	   is	   not	   easy	   to	   accept.	   Saying	   that	   a	   relation	  can	  exist	  without	  a	  term	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  contradictory	  affirmation.	  Husserl,	  in	  his	  third	  
Logical	   Investigation,	   §	   11,	   says	   that	   it	   is	   an	   “analytic	   necessity”	   (analytische	  
Notwendigkeit)	   that	   no	   relative	   exists	   without	   an	   existent	   correlative	   (Husserl	  1901/1984,	   vol.	   1,	   257.5–9).	   Brentano	   himself,	   in	   1911,	   in	   Aristoteles	   und	   seine	  
Weltanschauung,	   argues	   that	   this	   rule	   is	   an	   “axiom”,	   in	   other	   words	   an	   a	   priori	  knowledge,	  or	  an	  “immediate	  evident	  negative	  judgement”	  (Brentano	  1911/1977,	  p.	  33–35).	  Thus,	   it	   is	  rather	  odd	  to	  see	  Brentano	  change	  his	  mind	  a	  few	  years	   later	  by	  admitting	   relations	   without	   terms.	   And,	   as	   I	   pointed	   out	   earlier,	   it	   doesn’t	   seem	  possible	  to	  argue	  that	  Brentano	  is	  not	  a	  realist	  of	  relations	  or	  that	  he	  reduces	  them	  to	  absolute	  features.	  Indeed,	  I	  think	  that	  Brentano’s	  problem	  is	  his	  realism	  of	  relations.	  His	  radical	  realism	  leads	  him	  to	  admit	  relations	  without	  terms.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  problem	  to	  think	  of	  the	  grammar	  of	  intentionality	  as	  relational.	  But	  why	  should	  we	  conclude	  that	  this	  grammar	  entails	  the	  admission	  of	  a	  corresponding	  real	  relation	  without	  a	  term?	  In	  the	  same	  spirit,	  it	  is	  not	  a	  problem	  to	  admit	  that	  aftereffects	  exist.	  But	  why	  should	  we	  say	   that	  a	  relation	   to	  a	  non-­‐existent	   cause	   is	   real?	  A	   conceptualism	  of	   relations	  would	   have	   been	   a	   better	   solution.	   Now,	   as	   I	   have	   pointed	   out,	   Brentano’s	  “empiricism	   of	   concepts”	   (Begriffsempirismus),	   which	   requires	   all	   our	   concepts	   to	  come	   from	   concrete	   empirical	   intuitions,	   probably	   leads	   him	   to	   admit,	   for	   every	  primitive	  untranslatable	   concept,	   a	   corresponding	   real	   entity.	  Thus,	  he	   is	   somehow	  forced	   to	   admit	   real	   relations	   without	   terms.	   Be	   that	   as	   it	   may,	   as	   regards	  intentionality	   I	   think	   that	   Brentano	   could	   have	   avoided	   the	   problem	   of	   relations	  without	   terms.	   I	   think	  that	  Brentano’s	   last	   theory	  of	   intentionality	   is	   the	  result	  of	  a	  complex	   conjunction	  of	   incompatible	  philosophical	  decisions.	  Many	  other	   solutions	  would	  have	  been	  possible.	  A	  first	  solution	  would	  have	  been	  to	  say	  that	  intentionality	  is	  an	  absolute	  feature	  of	  the	  subject.	  But	  Brentano	  seemingly	  refused	  this	  solution.	  A	  second	  solution	  would	  have	  been	  to	  admit	  a	  peculiar	  ontological	  mode	  of	  being	   for	  non-­‐existent	   objects,	   as	   he	   did	   before	   reism	   with	   his	   “intentional	   object”,	   and	   as	  Meinong	   did	   too.	   Thus,	   a	   relation	   to	   a	   non-­‐existent	   object	   would	   not	   have	   been	   a	  relation	  without	  a	  term.	  A	  third	  solution	  would	  have	  been	  to	  say	  that	  intentionality	  is	  a	  potential	  relation	  to	  an	  object,	  like	  Marty	  does	  in	  his	  last	  theory	  of	  intentionality:	  if	  the	  object	  exists,	  the	  relation	  is	  actual,	  and	  if	  the	  object	  does	  not	  exist,	  the	  relation	  is	  potential	  (Marty	  1908,	  p.	  408–413).	  But	  Brentano	  does	  not	  adopt	  these	  solutions:	  the	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more-­‐than-­‐peculiar	   intentional	   relation	   without	   a	   term	   seems	   to	   be	   his	   last	   word	  concerning	   intentionality.	   For	   our	   part,	   we	   should	   take	   from	   this	   that	   if	   we	   want	  intentionality	   to	   always	   be	   a	   real,	   actual	   relation,	   we	   have	   to	   admit	   intentional	   or	  Meinongian	   objects	   in	   some	   cases;	   if	   we	   refuse	   to	   do	   this,	   then	   we	   should	   treat	  intentionality,	  at	  least	  in	  these	  cases,	  as	  an	  absolute	  feature	  of	  the	  subject.	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Appendix	  1	  
 Die	  relativen	  Bestimmungen	  sind	  von	  zwei	  Klassen<.	  D>ie	  einen	  beruhen	  auf	  Vergleich	  von	   absolut	   <G>egebenen,	   von	   welchen	   keines	   als	   solches	   einen	   Hinweis	   auf	   das	  andere	   enthält.	   So	   vergleiche	   ich	   ein	  Blau	  mit	  dem	  andern	  und	   sage,	   sie	   seien	  gleich	  oder	  ein	  Rot	  mit	  einem	  Blau,	  und	  sage	  sie	  seien	  verschieden.	  Jene	  Gleichheit	  und	  diese	  Verschiedenheit	   charakterisieren	   zwei	   absolute	   Dinge,	   die	   in	   ihrer	   Existenz	   nichts	  miteinander	   zu	   tun	  haben,	   vielmehr	   jedes	   ganz	  unabhängig	   gegeben	  <ist>,	   relativ	   zu	  einander.	  Ganz	  anders	  ist	  es,	  wenn	  es	  sich	  um	  einen	  Fall	  handelt,	  wo	  etwas	  von	  etwas	  gewirkt	   wird	   oder	   von	   ihm	   leidet<.>	   Das	   Leidende	   kann	   nicht	   leidend	   sein	   ohne	  Tätiges,	  wenn	   es	   auch	   denkbar	   scheint,	   dass	   es	   dasselbe	   Leidende	   sei,	  während	   das	  Tätige	  nicht	  dasselbe	  ist.	  So	  könnte	  einer	  den	  selben	  Sinneseindruck,	  den	  er	  von	  einem	  <gewissen	   Körper	   empfangen	   hat,>	   gewiss	   auch	   von	   einem	   anderen	   Körper	   und	  jedenfalls	   von	  Gott	   empfange<n;>	  das	  Leidende	  wäre	  dann	  dasselbe,	  das	  Tätige	  aber	  nicht	   mehr.	   Man	   hätte	   darum	   auch	   nicht	   mehr	   dieselbe	   Relation,	   obwohl	   dasselbe	  Leiden.	  Aber	  irgend	  welche	  Relation	  zu	  irgend	  welchem	  Tätigen	  würde	  bestehen	  und	  diese	  würde	  ebenso	  auf	  dem	  Leiden	  des	  einen	  und	  d<er>	  Tätigkeit	  des	  andern	  beruhen	  wie	   die	   Verschiedenheit	   des	   Roten	   und	   Blauen	   auf	   der	   Eigentümlichkeit	   dieser	  absoluten	  Farben.	  Der	  Unterschied	  ist	  also	  nur	  der,	  dass,	  was	  zugrunde	  liegt,	  [nicht]	  in	  der	   Art	   absolut	   ist,	   dass	   es	   weder	   in	   bestimmter	   noch	   unbestimmter	  Weise	   auf	   ein	  anderes	  ohne	  welches	  es	  nicht	  sein	  kann,	  hinweist,	  während	  dies	  im	  Falle	  des	  Leidens,	  wenigstens	  in	  unbestimmter	  Weise	  geschieht.	  	  Von	  der	  einen	  wie	  andern	  Klasse	  ist	  ein	  eigentümlicher	  Fall	  unterschieden,	  in	  welchem	  man	   von	   einer	   Beziehung	   zu	   sprechen	   pflegt,	   nämlich	   der	   der	   s.g.	   psychischen	  Beziehung	  zu	  einem	  Objekte.	  Wir	  sagen,	  ein	  Denkendes	  denkt	  ein	  Gedachtes,	  und	  ein	  Gedachtes	   wird	   von	   einem	   Denkenden	   gedacht,	   ganz	   ähnlich	   wie	   wir	   sagen,	   ein	  Grösseres	   ist	  nicht	  ohne	  ein	  Kleineres	  und	  ein	  Kleineres	   ist	  kleiner	  als	  ein	  Grösseres.	  Aber	   was	   läge	   hier	   anderes	   dem	   Denkenden	   als	   absolutes	   oder	   nur	   unbestimmt	  Hinweisendes	   unter?	   Offenbar	   nichts,	   vielmehr	   ist	   es	   immer	   eine	   besondere	  Veränderung	  dessen	  was	  wir	  denkend	  nennen,	  die	  es	  zum	  Denkenden	  macht	  und	  nie	  kann	   es	   geschehen,	   dass	   es	   ähnlich	   wie	   bei	   dem	   Grösseren	   geschieht,	   dass	   es	   ohne	  selbst	   ein<e>	  Änderung	   zu	   erfahren,	   aufhört	   grösser	   zu	   sein,	  weil	   ein	   anderes	  durch	  Wachstum	  sich	  verändert	  hat.	  Sieht	  man	   aber	  näher	   zu,	   so	   findet	  man,	   dass	   ein	   solches	   andere	  hier	   überhaupt	   gar	  nicht	  im	  eigentlichen	  Sinne	  existiert<.	  I>ndem	  der	  Denkende	  denkend	  wird,	  geschieht	  es	  dass	  man	   sich	   auch	  des	  Ausdrucks	  bedienen	  kann,	   das	  was	   e<r>	  denkend[e]	   zum	  Objekt	  habe,	  werde	  von	  ihm	  gedacht,	  möge	  es	  nun	  sein	  oder	  nicht	  sein<,>	  wie	  ja	  z.	  B.	  auch	   wenn	   einer	   Jupiter	   denkt,	   gesagt	   werden	   kann,	   dass	   Jupiter	   von	   ihm	   gedacht	  werde,	  obwohl	  derselbe	  nicht	  sei.	  Sollte	  es	  sich	  nicht	  um	  etwas	  Imaginäres	   in	   Jupiter	  handeln,	   sondern	   um	   etwas	   Reelles	   und	  wirklich	   Existierendes,	   so	   würde	   zwar	   von	  diesem	   gelten,	   dass	   es	   mit	   dem	   Denkenden	   in	   einer	   Relation	   sei,	   die	   als	   eine	   Art	  Übereinstimmung	   bezeichnet	   werden	   könnte,	   allein	   diese	   wäre	   nicht	   die	   s.g.	  psychische	  Beziehung	  des	  Denkenden	  zum	  Gedachten,	  sondern	  eine	  Übereinstimmung	  des	   Denkenden	   mit	   dem	   Dinge	   aufgrund	   der	   Eigentümlichkeit	   des	   Denkenden	  
	   22	  
einerseits	   und	   des	   Dinges	   andrerseits.	   Es	   wäre	   eine	   Relation,	   welche	   als	   eine	   Abart	  denen	  der	  Gleichheit	  und	  Ähnlichkeit	  im	  gewöhnlichen	  Sinne	  zuzuordnen	  wäre.	  Man	  hat	  es	  also	  nicht	  wie	  bei	  den	  auf	  Vergleich	  beruhenden	  Relationen	  und	  bei	  den	  auf	  Leiden	  und	  Tun	  <b>eruhenden	  mit	  einer	  wahren	  Relation	  zu	  tun,	  vielmehr	  hat	  der	  Fall	  noch	   eher	   Ähnlichkeit	   mit	   dem	   des	   Leidenden	   in	   dem	   Sinn,	   in	   welchem	   es	   sich	   um	  denselben	  Leidenden	  handeln	  kann,	  während	  das	  Tätige	  wechselt<;>	  er	  bleibt	   ja	  wie	  wir	   sagten	   als	   Leidender	   dasselbe,	   nur	   freilich	   erscheint	   im	   allgemeinen	   ein	   Tätiges	  gefordert.	  	  Wie	  das	  Gedachte	  etwas	  an	  sich	  gar	  nicht	  Existierendes	  <sein	  kann>,	  so	  kann	  es,	  da	  wir	  ja	  manchmal	  allgemeine	  Gedanken	  denken<,>	  auch	  etwas	  unbestimmtes	  sein.	  Indess	   sehen	  wir,	   dass	  der	   Fall	   des	   Leidens	   sowohl	   als	   der	  des	  Denkens,	  wenn	   auch	  beide	   nicht	   als	   solche	   zu	   den	   Relationen	   zu	   rechnen	   sind,	   doch	   insofern	   eine	  Ähnlichkeit	   damit	   haben,	   als	   auch	   hier	   der,	   welcher	   am	   Leidenden	   oder	   Denkenden	  denkt,	  sich	  als	  solcher	  mit	  mehreren	  Objekten	  zugleich	  befasst<;>	  der<,	  welcher>	  den	  Leidenden	   denkt,	   befasst	   sich	   auch	   mit	   einem	   Tätigen	   wenn	   auch	   unbestimmt[,]	  (welcher)<,>	   und	   wer	   den	   Denkenden	   denkt	   auch	   mit	   dem,	   was	   Gegenstand	   des	  Denkens	   ist,	   mag	   es	   nun	   existieren	   oder	   nicht.	   Und	   dieser	   Ähnlichkeit	   wird	   es	   ein	  Bedürfnis	  sein,	  auch	  sprachlich	  Ausdruck	  zu	  geben	  und	  so	  tun	  wir	  indem	  wir	  sagen,	  es	  beziehe	  sich	  das	  Leidende	  auf	  ein	  Tätiges	  und	  das	  Denkende	  auf	  ein	  Gedachtes<.>	  Dies	  kann	  keinen	   Schaden	  bringen,	   so	   lange	  man	   sich	  die	  wesentliche[n]	  Verschiedenheit	  der	  betreffenden	  Fälle	  klar	  im	  Bewusstsein	  erhält.	  	  Ms.	  Ps	  34,	  Von	  den	  Relationen,	  n°51040-­‐51048	  (13.05.1908)	  	  	  
Appendix	  2a	  	   Die	   Streitfrage	   löst	   sich	   leicht,	   wenn	   man	   Sorge	   trägt<,>	   alle	   Wortstreitigkeiten	   zu	  vermeiden	   (...)	   Um	   volle	   Klarheit	   in	   die	   Sache	   zu	   bringen,	   wird	   es	   gut	   sein	   auf	   die	  Eigentümlichkeit	   des	   Denkens	   aufmerksam	   zu	   machen,	   welche	   dem	   beziehenden	  Denken	   allgemein	   zukommt.	   Mag	   dasselbe	   ein	   bloss	   Vorstellendes	   oder	   auch	   ein	  Urteilendes	   oder	   sich	   gemütlich	   Beziehendes	   sein.	   Immer	   handelt	   es	   sich	   dabei	   um	  eine	  Mehrheit	  von	  Vorstellen	  und	  um	  ein	  Vorstellen	  mit	  verschiedenen	  Modis.	  Es	  wird	  ein	   Objekt	   in	   modo	   recto	   und	   ein	   Objekt	   in	   modo	   obliquo	   vorgestellt.	   Das	   in	   modo	  recto	   Vorgestellte	   Objekt	   muss	   sein,	   wenn	   das	   <R>elativ<e>	   sein	   soll,	   das	   in	   modo	  obliquo	  Vorgestellte	  aber	  nicht,	  ausser	  in	  ganz	  besonderen	  Fällen,	  wie	  z.	  B.	  ein	  evident	  Anerkennender	  nicht	  sein	  kann,	  ohne	  dass	  das	  von	  ihm	  anerkannte	  Objekt	  existiert.	  	  Ms.	  M	  76,	  Zur	  “Metaphysik”,	  n°30877-­‐30878	  (16.12.1915);	  source	  of	  Kategorienlehre,	  p.	  169	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Appendix	  2b	  	   Wenn	   man	   nur	   alles	   das	   erwägt,	   so	   möchte	   man	   vielleicht	   sagen,	   dass	   es	   sich	   bei	  de<m>	   zu	   etwas	   sich	   Verhaltenden	   um	   nichts	   anderes	   als	   solche	   Bestimmungen	  handle,	   bei	   welchen	   man,	   wenn	   man	   sie	   vorstellt<,>	   etwas	   in	   recto	   und	   etwas	   in	  obliquo	  vorstellt.	  	  Ms.	   Ps	   8,	   Vom	   dem	   zu	   etwas	   sich	   Verhaltenden,	   n°50028	   (08.01.1915);	   source	   of	  
Kategorienlehre,	  p.	  169	  	  	  	  





 Eigentümlich	   ist	   da,	   dass	   Aristoteles,	   indem	   er	   mehrere	   Klassen	   von	   Relativen	  unterscheidet,	   bei	   einer	   von	   ihnen	   lehrt,	   dass	   sie	   zwar	   real	   sei,	   aber	   kein	   reales	  Korrelat	  habe.	  Es	  ist	  dies	  die	  Relation	  des	  Denkens	  zum	  Gedachten.	  Das	  Gedachte	  ist	  ja	  bloss	  ens	  rationis.	  Sieht	  man	  genau	  zu,	  so	  gilt	  von	  dieser	  Klasse	  nicht,	  was	  Aristoteles	  von	   den	   anderen	   behauptet,	   dass	   das	   relative	   Attribut	   ohne	   Änderung	   am	   Subjekt	  gewonnen	  oder	  verloren	  werden	  könne.	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